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Open Elite? Social Mobility, Marriage and Family in Florence, 1282-1494
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the wealth of quantifiable material in the Florentine archives, historians
have not in large numbers followed the path-breaking lead of Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber
in analyzing these archival materials from a statistical point of view. Exceptions include
Cohn, Weissman, Molho, Litchfield, Barbagli, Padgett, McLean, Emigh, and Botticini.2
Statistical methods remain invaluable tools, however, for answering a variety of
historiographical questions, including the social-history ones in which Herlihy was
interested. What were the family structures in Renaissance Florence, for various
categories of people? What were the logics of intermarriage among these families? How
much social mobility was there in Renaissance Florence? Did any of these change during
the Trecento and Quattrocento? Statistical methods are not the only procedures through
which questions such as these can be answered, but they provide a useful perspective,
especially on aggregate patterns and trends.
Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber, along with the follow-up by Barbagli, posed their
questions and answers about family structure at the level of the household. In contrast,
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Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber, 1978, 1985; Cohn, 1980, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002; Weissman, 1982;

Molho, 1968, 1994, 2000; Morrison, Kirshner and Molho, 1985; Litchfield, 1986; Barbagli, 1994; Padgett
and Ansell, 1993; Padgett and McLean, 1997, 2006, forthcoming; McLean, 1998, 2007; Emigh, 1997a,
1997b, 2000, 2003; Botticini, 1999, 2000, 2003. Outside of Florence, prominent examples of historical
studies using quantitative methods include Tilly, 1964, 1995; Laslett, 1965, 1972; Stone, 1965; Stone and
Fawtier-Stone, 1984; Sewell, 1985; Markoff, 1996; Hoffman, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal, 2000; Clark,
2007. Due to the richness of its sources, the depth and diversity of the quantitative data in the Padgett
relational database is unusual even by these high standards.
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this article poses its similar questions and answers at the level of the lineage. The best
current point of departure for this level of analysis is the study of Florentine marriage by
Molho.3 In addition to providing a statistical overview of Florentine marriage patterns,
Molho’s study usefully linked the two related topics of lineage intermarriage and political
elite structure. Molho argued that stability both in Florentine lineages and in Florentine
“ruling class” composition were caused by endogamous intermarriage, which recycled
substantial dowries among a relatively closed set of elite lineages, thereby buffering them
against the high elite-family extinction rates common in other countries in Europe.
The statistical results herein will support Molho’s conclusion about the
importance of marriage for sustaining the resilience of Florentine lineages over perilous
demographic time. But they will not support Molho’s conclusion about elite stability and
closure, at least for the two-century time period of this study. I shall document high rates
of relative social mobility among lineages on the dimensions of wealth and political
office, and high rates of social mobility during the Albizzi regime on the dimension of
marriage itself.
The resolution of the apparent paradox between lineage stability and elite fluidity
will come from my statistical finding that there were in Renaissance Florence three
distinct and uncorrelated dimensions of status stratification among lineages – wealth,
ruling political faction, and lineage size. Marriage endogamy existed on each of these
three dimensions – namely, wealthy lineages married among themselves, politically
powerful lineages married among themselves, and large lineages married among
themselves. However, these dimensions were not statistically related to each other –
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Molho, 1994. See also Fabbri, 1991.
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namely, wealthy lineages were not the same on average as powerful lineages or as large
lineages, and powerful lineages were not the same on average as large lineages. Since
exogamy occurred on all three unrelated dimensions, the counter-intuitive net effect was
widespread exogamy and the marriage recruitment of middle-strata families into upperstrata patrilineage family structures. The more Florentine elites tried to close to door
behind them to social mobility by others on one dimension, the more they opened other
doors to social mobility on different dimensions. Because Trecento and Quattrocento
Florentines failed to converge on a single criterion of status stratification, in other words,
individual intentions to create a closed elite could not aggregate into the collective
behavior of actually producing one.
One consequence of exogamous elites marrying non-elites was the rapid diffusion
downward of the patrilineage family ideal into middle strata within Florentine society.
This downward diffusion occurred at the same time as the decline of patrilineage among
its original exemplars – namely, large magnate clans. Paradoxically, Trecento and
Quattrocento Florentines intensely imitated a family model that was itself decaying.4
My answer to the “Open Elite?” question in the title of this article, therefore,
largely will be yes, in spite of Florentine intentions to the contrary. This conclusion does
not imply rejection of the term “elite” altogether, but it does imply its reconceptualization
– as much a fluidly reproduced aspiration and ideal as a stable demographic reality.
I shall develop this conclusion in the following sequence. The next section will
describe the data and its sources. The third section will present basic demographic
information on family population and on birth and death rates of lineages over time. A
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Below I show how these cross-currents help to resolve the Goldthwaite-Kent debate of the 1970s.
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fourth section will document the mobility of Florentine families, relative to each other, in
wealth, in political office, and in intermarriage. A fifth section will document the lack of
correlation among various dimensions of “elite”. A sixth section will analyze statistically
the social, economic and political causes of intermarriage among Florentine families. A
seventh section will analyze statistically the social, economic and political causes of
growth and decline in lineage size. A penultimate eighth section will examine changes in
the internal structures of these lineages. A conclusion will discuss how all of these trends
in mobility, marriage and lineage were contingent upon the institutional context of
Florentine republicanism. I do not expect to see the same degree of elite fluidity in nonrepublican political contexts, such as the subsequent Florence of the sixteenth,
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

2. DATA AND SOURCES
The overall quantitative dataset from which material for this article was drawn has
been assembled from multiple archival and secondary sources, compiled and
computerized over a twenty-year period. Over one hundred individual archival sources
have been computerized and linked through person IDs into the overall “Padgett
relational dataset.” Following the example of Herlihy, I will make this data publicly
available over the internet in due course. This dataset contains economic, political, and
kinship information on 42,763 Florentine males (37,128 with identifiable family
memberships) and 12,875 Florentine females (11,714 with identifiable family
memberships), who lived during the two-hundred-year time period of 1282 to 1500.
Primary sources for the subset of this information analyzed statistically in this article are
listed in the bibliography.
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Based on all sources, 1,697 distinct Florentine families have been identified over
this two-hundred year period, using the criterion of common last name (taking care to
split similar last names into separate families, if those were not related). Of these 1,697
last-name families, 1,177 could be further classified as patrilineages, using the additional
criterion of known grandfather-father-son genealogical descents. Out of all persons in
common-last-name families, 76.1% of them, males and females, were successfully linked
to fathers also present in the dataset. A comprehensive listing of these last-name and
lineage families, along with information about their social status and sizes, is provided in
a 35-page appendix to the online version of this article. This list is essentially a complete
enumeration of Florentine families, so defined, for the 1352-1480 period. It is an
incomplete census for the 1282-1352 and 1480-1500 periods.5
Of most direct relevance to this article are three sets of data: tax censuses,
political offices, and marriages. Six tax censuses have been coded and incorporated into
the relational database. The tax censuses in question, selected to be approximately
twenty-five years apart,6 are the 1352 estimo, the 1379 prestanze, the 1403 prestanze, the
5

One measure of the completeness of any dataset’s enumeration is the percentage of persons in newly

coded sources who have already appeared in the pre-existing dataset. Recently Katalin Prajda, employed as
my research assistant, has been coding all speakers in the Consulte e Pratiche advisory councils, from 1348
to 1500. She has found that 97% of the speakers in her coding were already included in my dataset,
complied from many disparate sources. (Of course this inclusion rate does not apply to non-speakers in the
Consulte e Pratiche – e.g., females, deceased children, and the popolo minuto.)
6

Fragments of tax censuses from earlier periods – 1305 and 1326 – have also been coded, but in these

censuses the percentage of archival records that has survived is small. In the cases of the 1352, 1379, 1403
and 1458 tax censuses, households were coded in my first round of coding from primary sources under the
following restriction: “code all households with last names and all households with tax assessment above 1
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1427 catasto, the 1458 catasto, and the 1480 catasto. These tax censuses will be the basis
for estimating social-mobility rates in wealth, as well as for measuring neighborhood
residence. The 1427 catasto was originally computerized by David Herlihy and
Christiane Klapisch-Zuber and is currently available online.7 The 1480 catasto was
originally computerized by Anthony Molho and Julius Kirshner and was generously
donated by Molho. The 1403 prestanze was coded by Nicoletta Baldini, employed as
Padgett’s research assistant.8 The 1352 estimo, 1379 prestanze, and 1458 catasto were
coded by Padgett, partly on the basis of microfilmed copies of the 1352 and 1379 tax
censuses generously donated by Samuel Cohn. Archival sources for these tax records are
provided in the bibliography. I discuss below the standardization procedures used for
making comparable the disparate assessments underlying these various tax censuses.
In addition to taxes, all members of the Florentine city council or Priorate, from
its origin in 1282 until 1500 have been coded from the Priorista volume in the Newberry
Library in Chicago. These lists of city-council members will be the basis for
measurement of social-mobility rates in political office. Subsequent to my Newberry

florin (or currency equivalent).” The coding restriction implied that 30.2% (for 1352), 34.2% (for 1379),
51.9% (for 1403), and 56.3% (for 1458) of all households were coded in these censuses, even though 100%
of identifiable last-named households were coded. Non-coded households had non-family names like
“John, son of Paul, shoemaker.” It is extremely difficult to link popolo minuto or “little people” like these
into genealogies. My research team is currently in the process of going back to code all households in these
tax censuses, not just last-named households. From this second round of coding, in process, I know the total
numbers of households in each tax census – information required for figure 1 below.
7

www.stg.brown.edu/projects/catasto.
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Cf. Martines, 1963, 351-378.
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coding, office-holding data from the post-1383 Tratte have been made available online
through the collective efforts of Herlihy, Litchfield, Barducci, and Molho.9 From both
online and supplementary archival sources, political-office holding in the Buonuomini
and Gonfalonieri advisory colleges, and consul and matriculation lists in the Calimala,
Cambio, Lana and Por Santa Maria guilds have also been incorporated into the relational
database, back to their origin dates in the archival sources. Genealogical reconstruction of
the 1,697 families was based on names and dates from all of the 100+ files in the
relational dataset, including but exceeding the material described in this section.
Finally, 11,107 Florentine marriages over two-hundred years have been coded
(10,306 with identifiable last-name family memberships), with exact dates when
recorded10 in sources or with estimated11 dates when not. Two clusters of sources form
the basis of this marriage dataset: (a) the carte dell’Ancisa,12 located in the Archivio di

9

www.stg.brown.edu/projects/tratte.

10

The carte dell’Ancisa sometimes recorded the same marriage multiple times, due to the multiple primary

sources consulted by Pier Antonio dell’Ancisa. In such cases the earliest recorded dell’Ancisa date was
taken to be the marriage date. This procedure was selected after comparing Ancisa’s various recorded
dates, if they existed, with other temporal data known about the groom and/or bride.
11

Estimation of marriage dates, when necessary, was performed through triangulation against other secure

dates in the computer records of offspring – especially, birth dates of children – and in the target person’s
own computer records – for example, birth dates, guild matriculation dates, political office dates, etc.
Birthdates were coded from the Libri d’èta (A.S.F., Tratte 77, 79).
12

Pier Antonio di Filippo dell’Ancisa spent much of his seventeenth-century life compiling fourteen thick

volumes of lists of Florentine marriages from a variety of archival sources. The wide variety of sources
consulted by Ancisa, most prominently dowry contracts, are listed in ASF index volume N/187, p. 153.
Many of the original sources consulted in the mid 1600s by Ancisa, especially his most important source,
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Stato di Firenze, and (b) published genealogies, the most numerous and thorough of
which were compiled by Luigi Passerini in the nineteenth century. In all, the marriages of
416 families were directly coded, 378 families from the carte dell’Ancisa and 59 families
from published sources. By virtue of someone’s interest in their compilation,13 coded
families tended to be the larger and the more well-established families in Florence. It is
important to note, however, that I coded all the reported marriages of these 416 families,
even to other Florentine families not in the directly-coded subset. Including families
indirectly coded through their intermarriage with the directly coded families, at least
some of the marriages of 1,253 last-name families are represented in the dataset. What
are missing from the sample, by virtue of omission in the sources, are marriages between
small, usually obscure Florentine families. Marriages between nuclear families without
last names at all – the popolo minuto – are not included in this dataset.
In spite of its limitations, data coverage is very substantial. I estimated the
percentage of all Florentine marriages contained in my dataset through the following
procedure: In each tax census, from 1352 to 1480, I calculated the percentages of fathers
– namely, male household heads with known children14 – for whom I had a record of

dowry contracts, have unfortunately now been lost. For an amusing and appreciative comment about the
character of Pier Antonio, see the remarks by his near contemporary Gamurrini, 1671, 415.
13

Sample bias against small obscure families is much less severe for the extensive carte dell’Ancisa than it

is for published sources. This dataset on marriage is definitely not confined to “elite” marriages. Middlestrata marriages are quite numerous here, as long as the persons in question had last names.
14

I ignore the quantitatively minor issue of illegitimate children (so-called naturale) in this estimation

procedure. Had I been able to identify and exclude them consistently, estimated sample rates would have
been higher than reported, because the (now legitimate) father denominator would have been decreased.
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their marriage. This estimation procedure revealed that from 39% to 62% of all
marriages15 among Florentine last-named families appear in my dataset.

3. DEMOGRAPHY OF FLORENTINE FAMILIES
The simplest level at which to begin is basic demography: first the population of
Florentine households contained within lineages, and then the birth and death rates of
Florentine lineages, over time.
Firstly, what percentage of the Florentine population was assembled into social
families? Here the word “family” refers not to biology or to households but to social
identification: namely, what percentage of the Florentine households in tax censuses had
last names? And what percentage of Florentine households in tax censuses were members
of patrilineages? Especially in the artisanal popolo minuto, most Florentines had names
like “John, son of Francis, blacksmith,” not names like “John Francis Smith.” Identifying
oneself as a member of a corporate descent group through a public last name, and being
so recognized by others, was one sign of having attained social stature in the city.
Especially in a growing city like Florence, with many immigrants, the attainment of a
recognized family name was the result of a dynamic process of becoming accepted as

15

Specifically the estimated sample coverage rates were these: (a) for 1352, the estimated percentage of all

marriages in my identified 1,697 families that was identified and coded was 47.2%; (b) for 1379, it was
39.3%; (c) for 1403, it was 39.6%; (d) for 1427, it was 41.2%; (e) for 1458, it was 53.3%; and (f) for 1480,
it was 61.9%. These coverage rates are very substantial for such a distant past. They are a testament both to
the richness of the original archives and to the assiduousness of the many researchers over the centuries
whose labors have been assembled and computerized here.
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contributing members of the community and citizens in the republic.16 Attaining a last
name, in other words, was itself one measure of social mobility.
Figure 1 presents data, over time across the six tax censuses, on the percentages of
tax households in Florence with reported last names and in patrilineages. Last-name
percentages were measured in two ways: (a) percentages of household heads with last
names, as these appeared in the tax documents,17 and (b) percentages of household heads
who were members of the 1,697 families with last names, confirmed across multiple
sources. These two measurements closely agree in their results because of the high rate of
last-name consistency. Lineage percentages were calculated on the basis of various taxcensus households who were members of the 1,177 last-named families linked through
explicitly verified male descent, at least to the extent of grandfather-father-son. The data
in figure 1 demonstrate that the percentage of Florentine tax households with last names
increased over time from 27-30% in 1352 to about 45-50% in the late-1400s, and that the
percentage of Florentine tax households in lineages increased over time from 23% in
1352 to about 40-45% in the late 1400s.18 There is not much practical difference between

16

For example, children of Piero, identified by di Piero, might evolve into the Pieri family. (In Latin, Pieri

can mean either a last name or an ablative.) The same logic often held for place names – e.g., da Vinci.
17

“As they appear in the documents” means either (a) I recognized the family name (often with the

assistance of either de’ or da prefix), or (b) three consecutive names were listed, the third name of which
might be ambiguous (especially in Latin) about whether it referred to a last name or to a grandfather.
18

These percentages are consistent with the estimates for 1427 and 1480 reported in Molho, 2000, 240. But

for 1342, Molho reported the percentage of households with surname to be only 12.8%, much lower than
my own comparable estimates for 1352. The reason is Molho’s very conservative coding rule, for 1342
only, of counting a third name as a surname only if the partitive de’ was included in the document.
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the categories of last-named family and of lineage, because most of the last-named
families that were not lineages were tiny and inconsequential.19 The trend upward in all
measurements is roughly linear, but slight accelerations are noticeable after changes in
political regime – for example, after the post-Ciompi (or Albizzi) regime that commenced
in 1382, and after the Medici regime that commenced in 1434. More and more frequently
during the course of the Renaissance, Florentine households were identified in tax
registers as belonging to lineages and last-name families.
-- figure 1 about here –
Figure 2 subdivides last-named families into various social strata, in order to
display different trends in family size, measured as average number of households per
last-named family. “Social strata” are defined by political age of families – that is, by the
dates at which their ancestors first entered the Priorate. In particular, “popolani” were
those families whose ancestors were first elected to the Priorate between 1282, the year
of the Priorate’s origin, and 1342. “New men” were those families whose ancestors were
first elected to the Priorate between 1343 and 1377.20 “New-new men” I define as those
families whose ancestors were first elected to the Priorate between 1378 and 1433.
“Medici era” I define as those families whose ancestors were first elected to the Priorate
between 1434 and 1493. And “not admitted” I define as those families which never had a

19

Explicit listings of these various categories are provided in an online appendix. Many of the non-lineage

last-named families are either (a) nuclear families, with no grandfather, or (b) place names of immigrants
from the same town, who were not directly related, or (c) unrelated descendents of ancestors with
coincidentally the same first name (e.g., del Ricco). Moreover, 57.3% of non-lineage last-named families
were in the lowest “not admitted” social strata (see below), compared to 23.9% of the lineage families.
20

Cf. Brucker, 1962, 21.
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member in the Priorate before 1494. “Magnates” were those families legally prohibited
from holding high political office by the Ordinances of Justice in 1393. Magnate families
were reclassified as “ex-magnates” at the date at which their legal banishment was
repealed, if it ever was.21
-- figure 2 about here -The data on family size in figure 2 reveal that the sharp family-structure
distinctions in medieval times between patrilineal elites and non-patrilineal guildsmen,
traces of which were still evident in 1352, gradually became muted as the Renaissance
proceeded. The average number of households in magnate lineages declined gradually
from about ten in 1352 to about seven in 1480.22 Conversely, the average number of
households in popolani lineages rose from about four in 1352 to about seven in 1480 – a
convergence, in other words, between magnate and popolani lineage sizes. The three
middle-strata lineages of new men, new-new men, and Medici era all gradually rose in
average lineage size over time, following the trend of popolani lineages. Alone among all
strata, families in the lowest “not admitted” stratum never changed in their small average
size. Subject to confirmation by the more sophisticated statistical methods employed

21

For insightful discussions of the conflictual politics among social strata, see Brucker, 1962, 1977, Cohn,

1980, 1999, and Najemy, 1982, 2006. For new men, see Becker and Brucker, 1956, and Becker, 1962. For
magnates, see Becker, 1965, and Lansing, 1991, 239-40. For ex-magnates, see Klapisch-Zuber, 2006, 45357. The entire category of magnate was abolished in 1434 by the early Medici regime, but I continue to
label magnate families as such after this date, in order to determine how their social treatment in marriage
was affected by their altered legal status.
22

For a case study of one magnate family’s decline, see Bizzochi, 1982. Numerical itemization of the

decline of various magnate families is provided in Klapisch-Zuber, 2006, 464.
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below, inclusion in high political office appears to have had a causal effect on the growth
and decline of Florentine lineages. Regardless of cause, there was a convergence in
lineage size among those Florentine families who participated in Florentine government,
with sharp medieval distinctions across social strata diminishing.
In table 1, I present data on the rates of survival of lineages, by social strata across
time. Because lowest-strata families were only gradually coming into existence in the
period under study, 100-year survival rates could be computed only for the upper strata of
magnates, popolani, and new men. For magnates, popolani and new men these lineage
survival rates were 83.1%, 73.1% and 73.7% respectively. These high rates of lineage
survival are consistent with the findings of Molho, who stressed the durability of
Florentine lineages.23
-- table 1 about here –
Lineage survival rates are one of the few statistics for which it is possible to
compare Florence with other early-modern European polities.24 All of the comparison
23

Molho, 1994, 365-410, identified 471 fifteenth-century lineages, which he labeled the “Florentine ruling

class.” Of these 417 lineages, 68.3% appeared also on the list by Litchfield, 1986, 362-382, of 714
“patrician” Florentine families in the sixteenth through eighteen centuries.
24

For Forez in south-central France, Perroy, 1962, 31, has shown French noble lignages to have survived at

the rates of 46.3% for 1300-1400 and 44.9% for 1400-1500. For Bayeux in Normandy, Wood, 1977, 7, has
shown French noble lignages to have survived at the rate of 46.6% for 1463-1598. This extrapolates to a
100-year estimated rate of 51.5% for 1463-1562. For two regions in South Hesse, Gensicke, 1965, 129-30,
has shown that German noble families survived at the rate of 48.9% for 1430-1555. According to Van
Nierop, 1993, 51, Holland noble families first had the very high survival rate of 72.4% for 1555-1650, but
then experienced the rapidly declining survival rates of 48.0% in 1600-1700 and of 28.6% in 1650-1750.
On the other side of the English Channel, Stone, 1965, 169, has calculated that English peerage families
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studies refer to nobility and gentry rooted in landed estates. Intuitively one might think
that such an economic foundation would lead to greater family stability than would the
volatile commercialism of the Florentine urban economy. But Florentine lineages in fact
exhibited more resilience over time than did their counterparts in northern Europe. Below
in table 5, I examine statistically the reasons for their demographic success.
In table 2, I present data on the frequency of birth of new lineages over time, to
complement the data on survival of existing lineages in table 1. The data show a huge
wave of new-lineage formation in the generation after the Black Death, as might be
expected in a city of new immigrants. The Albizzi regime of 1382-1433 continued to
exhibit a high volume of new-lineage formation, after the Ciompi revolt. The Medici
regime of 1434-1493, in contrast with that of the Albizzi, exhibited a much reduced rate
of new-lineage formation.25
-- table 2 about here -survived in their male lines at the rate of 58.7% for 1559-1659. For an earlier period, McFarlane, 1973,
172-73, has shown English ‘baron’ families to have survived at the low rates of 34.6% for 1300-1400, and
34.0% for 1400-1500. However, McFarlane used the primogeniture criterion of continuous, unbroken male
descent, appropriate for dynastic families, rather than the criterion of “any male descendant” used here and
the previously mentioned studies. Grant, 1985, 225-231, also used the primogeniture method of defining
extinction for the Scottish nobility. I used his data to calculate 100-year Scottish noble-family survival rates
of 48.8% for 1325-1424 and of 62.9% for 1400-1500.
25

The last number in table 2 of seven new lineages formed in the period between 1458 and 1480 might be

artificially suppressed because of truncation effects. That is, new lineages in that late period might not have
had enough time to witness the formation grandfather-father-son genealogies by 1480, even if they were in
the process of doing so. The true 1480 number therefore is probably higher than the seven reported in table
2, but also probably lower than the thirty-one new lineages accurately reported for 1458.

16
To call the Black Death of 1348 a shock to the demography of Florence is an
understatement. Below in table 4, however, I demonstrate that the rules of marriage in
Florence were not affected by this enormous catastrophe. This anomaly and others26 lead
me to hypothesize that political turmoil was an additional factor driving new-lineage
formation in Florence. Indirect evidence for this hypothesis is provided in figure 3, which
plots the volume of lineages newly admitted to the Priorate, over time. Sharp surges of
new families into government during the major political crises of 1282, 1343 and 1378
are evident in this figure. The Medici takeover in 1434, in contrast, produced a much
smaller wave of new-family incorporation. My hypothesis is that new lineages formed at
least in part in response to the expansion in citizenship within Florentine republicanism –
more particularly, to the Trecento expansion in eligibility for scrutiny election to the
highest office of city council or Priorate. This political-incorporation hypothesis is
intended as a supplement to, not a substitute for, the Black Death and immigration
explanation for the birth rates of new lineages.
-- figure 3 about here --

4. SOCIAL MOBILITY OF FLORENTINE FAMILIES
Figure 4 presents data on social mobility in relative wealth, for families in the six
tax censuses. The 1427 catasto measured and reported net wealth from all revenue
26

I have not published data on this yet, but the partnership structure of cambio banks also did not change at

the time of the Black Death, in spite of the loss of a huge percentage of the bankers themselves. See Padgett
and McLean, 2006, for a study of major changes in the partnership structure of cambio banks and merchant
banks immediately after the Ciompi revolt. That study analyzed the emergence of the sistema di aziende
first discussed in depth by Melis, 1962.
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streams, by household.27 The 1480 catasto measured and reported real-estate wealth, by
household.28 The other estimi and prestanze levied and reported tax assessments, not
wealth.29 Currency units were in lire for 1352 and in florins thereafter. Genealogies and
last names enabled the tracking of lineages through these tax censuses, despite their
changing composition of households. Changing Florentine tax-assessment procedures
creates a challenge for the researcher seeking to establish comparable units of wealth
over time, required to measure economic mobility.
The approach taken here to these measurement challenges was not to try to
measure “true” absolute wealth, a task that is impossible with heterogeneous tax registers
alone, but rather to focus on relative tax assessment or wealth, with families only ranked
ordinally with respect to each other. Mobility then is change in relative rankings.
Specifically, I first calculated “average wealth (or tax assessment) per household” for
each last-named family, for each census, by dividing the total sum of the wealth (or tax
assessments) for all the tax households in each last-named family by the number of
households in that family.30 Secondly, I simplified these family-average statistics into
27
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lineages could be deemed “wealthy” only on the basis of their larger demographic size. The same point
applies to political comparisons. Across many authors, the Florentine historiography paints a portrait of
economic and political concentration in part because of its failure to apply per-capita standardization.
Molho, 1968, 409, is a praiseworthy exception. A different way to put the same point is that economic and
political concentration can be produced by patrilineal family dynamics as well as by economic and political
dynamics. For clear interpretation, these various causal dynamics need to be teased apart.
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ordinal rankings of relative wealth, in order to abstract away from problems of varying
monetary units.31 Thirdly, I aggregated these rankings into coarse categories – namely,
into the categories of top 10% of families32 in average-per-household wealth, 10-25% in
wealth, 25-50% in wealth, 50-75% in wealth, and lowest 25% in wealth. This aggregation
into relative strata dampens the effect of measurement error.
Figure 4 tracks the movement of Florentine families across these averagehousehold-wealth strata across time, as families rose and declined relative to each other.
The data exhibit high rates of relative economic mobility among Florentine families
during the Renaissance. During the 1352 to 1480 era of these tax censuses, only about
25% to 40% of Florentine families persisted in the wealthiest top 10% relative-wealth
bracket from one twenty-five-year census to the next. Over the 1325 to 1480 period,33
only about 40% to 55% of Florentine families persisted even in the top 25% relativewealth bracket from one tax census to the next. Stability in relative wealth status, in other
words, was unusual rather than common among families in fourteenth- and fifteenthcentury Florence. Stability in family wealth was especially low during the post-Ciompi
31
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Given wide dispersion in number of households per family, “top 10%” refers to the top 10% of numbers

of households contained in the wealthiest families, not the top 10% of the wealthiest families. The latter
approach could have produced far more than 10% of households. Note that this procedure ranks relative
wealth only within the population of Florentine families. ‘Little people’ like “John, son of Francis,
blacksmith” are excluded in these calculations, because the goal is to measure social mobility of families.
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records from only one sesto or large neighborhood have survived. Data are too scanty in 1325 to support
serious statistical analysis. Data on “top 10%” for 1325 are not reported in figure 2, for example, because
there were only thirteen such families – far too small for ratios to be statistically reliable.
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transition from the 1379 tax census to the 1403 tax census. Turnover rates like these,
every twenty-five years or so, made it difficult for Florentine families to maintain
themselves in the upper brackets of relative wealth over long periods of time.34
-- figure 4 about here -Next I turn to family mobility in politics. Figure 5 reports stability of Florentine
last-named families in their membership in the Priorate or city council, from 1318 until
1493.35 Two strata of political participation rates in this so-called reggimento were
defined, for purposes of measuring movement across these thresholds: (a) a family
average of one or more Priorate seats per household, within each thirty-year period, and
(b) a family average of only 1/2 or more Priorate seats per household, within each thirtyyear period. Figure 3 reports the percentages of families who maintained themselves
within the Priorate across time, at these two different participation-rate thresholds.
-- figure 5 about here --

34

The percentage of top 10% relative-wealth and top 25% relative-wealth families in 1352 who survived as

such to 1480 was 14.9% and 18.3%, respectively. The percentage of top 10% and top 25% families in 1379
who survived as such to 1480 was 11.5% and 23.8%, respectively.
35

The Priorate was founded in 1282. I have data on Priorate memberships dating back to this origin, but,

absent tax censuses from that far back, I have no data on family sizes (i.e., numbers of tax households per
family) with which to standardize these Priorate participation rates. Even standardizing the 1318-1348
political period with family-size data from the 1352 estimo is pushing it. Normally Priorate participation
was standardized by the average of family sizes reported in the two tax censuses, which bracketed the
period. For example, standardized family participation rates were calculated by dividing the number of
times that family appeared in the Priorate during 1348-1378 by the average household size of that family,
as reported in the 1352 and 1379 tax censuses.
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At the higher participation rate of one or more Priorate seats per household every
thirty years, only 30-55% of Florentine families maintained this level of political
participation from one thirty-year period to the next. At the lower participation rate of
only 1/2 or more Priorate seats per household every thirty years, 50-70% of Florentine
families maintained their participation from one period to the next. Some political
stability is observed here, but clearly family turnover in Florentine politics was high.
Consistent with the temporal patterns in economic mobility documented in figure 4, the
highest rate of political turnover in Renaissance Florence occurred between the
reggimento of 1348-1377 and the reggimento of 1378-1403. Both in wealth and in
political office, the highest levels of family mobility are observed in the Albizzi regime,
after the Ciompi revolt.
Finally I have calculated social mobility in marriage. It is not straightforward to
measure the “prestige” or the “value” of a lineage in the Florentine marriage market,36
and hence its change over time. But social-network methods can be used to assess the
degree to which a last-named family was in the core or on the periphery of the Florentine
intermarriage network. In particular, the statistical concept of “structural cohesion”37
measures the minimum number of links, anywhere in the network, that have to be severed
in order to disconnect any particular node (perhaps including its neighbors) from the rest
of the network. For example, a family having structural-cohesion level of one means that
only one (well chosen) marriage has to be eliminated in order to detach that family from
36
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the rest of the Florentine marriage network. “Periphery” can be defined as the set of
nodes in such fragile network positions. But to take another example, a family having
structural-cohesion level of four means that a minimum of four (perfectly chosen)
marriages must be deleted in order to detach that family, perhaps along with its in-laws,
from the rest of the Florentine marriage network. “Core” can be defined as the set of
nodes in such deeply integrated and hard-to-remove network positions. Algorithms were
constructed to calculate Florentine families’ structural cohesion levels (from zero to
eight), over time, from the marriage data described above.38 “Social mobility” in this
marriage context means movement of a family, through its pattern of marriages with
other families, into or out of the core of the city’s marriage network.
Using the same thirty-year periodization as in previous figures,39 figure 6 reports
the rates of movement of families into or out of the Florentine marriage-network core,
over time. Two levels of structural-cohesion were used as thresholds for measuring
movement: (a) “core” is operationally defined in that figure as a structural-cohesion level
of four or more; (b) “bi-component” is defined there as the weaker structural-cohesion
level of only two or more. Movement into or out of the core can be interpreted as
movement of families into or out of the Florentine “marriage elite.” Movement into or
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Florentine families was assembled out of my global dataset from all marriages with dates in this range. And
likewise for all other thirty-year time periods.
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out of the bi-component can be interpreted as movement of families into or out of the
Florentine marriage market itself.
-- figure 6 about here -Here, data are somewhat at variance with the generally high-mobility story told in
figures 4 and 5. As a bi-component whole, the Florentine marriage market was very
stable over time: 80-90% of Florentine families persisted at the low structural-cohesion
level of two or more. Since this low structural-cohesion level measures only the
persistence of Florentine families in the marriage market, this is not so surprising.
However for three out the five transitions between periods measured, Florentine elites
also were very stable in their global marriage-network patterns, even at the high
structural-cohesion level of four or more. In particular, for the transition surrounding the
Black Death (namely, from 1318-1347 to 1348-1377) and for the two Medici-era
transitions (namely, from 1404-1433 to 1434-1463, and from 1434-1463 to 1464-1493),
about 80 to 90% of Florentine families in the Florentine marriage-network core
succeeded in preserving their core marriage status into the next thirty-year period, in spite
of the high levels of economic and political turnover documented above. Consistent with
the interpretation of Molho, 1994, this is clear evidence for conservatism in Florentine
intermarriage: elite marriage acted as a barrier (successful or not) against strong currents
of economic and political mobility.
This elite conservatism in marriage, however, weakened significantly during the
Albizzi regime, following the Ciompi revolt (in other words, from 1344-1377 to 13781403 and from 1378-1403 to 1404-1433). In those decades, rates of successful
persistence of families within the Florentine marriage core dropped sharply to only 55-
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65%. In the subsequent Medici regime, the marriage core rebounded to its pre-Ciompi
high rate of endogamy. The family composition of this reconstituted marriage “elite”
under the Medici, however, had changed because of the intervening more socially open
period. All three measures of social mobility – economic, political, and marriage – agree
that the greatest period of fluidity in Florentine families’ relative status occurred after the
Ciompi revolt. However “oligarchic” the Albizzi regime was in its politics and policies, it
was not so in its degree of social mobility.

5. MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF FLORENTINE “ELITE”
Despite demonstrable resistance in marriage to social fluidity (except during the
Albizzi regime), high rates of Florentine social mobility in wealth, in political office, and
in last names are evident. The consequences of such high rates of mobility for elite
structure, however, depend upon how these various dimensions of mobility were
interrelated. If stratification dimensions were strongly correlated, then Florentine families
could move up or down the various dimensions roughly in tandem – perhaps led by
success or failure in one dimension, such as wealth, which translated into other domains.
Such consistency among stratification dimensions would produce temporal succession of
families within an elite structure that was well defined in aggregate, but not internal
contradiction within the elite structure itself. On the other hand, if the stratification
dimensions were empirically not correlated, then Florentine elite coherence itself
becomes very much an open question. In that case, the data would point not to an “elite”
or to a “ruling class” but rather to the existence of multiple contending Florentine
“elites”, each standing at the head of a different status hierarchy. Not only our
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interpretation of Florentine social mobility, but also our interpretation of Florentine
politics, depends upon how the multiple dimensions of Florentine stratification fit
together, to induce either coherence or incoherence in Florentine elite structure.
Table 3 presents empirical correlations among four dimensions of Florentine
stratification – social status, wealth, political office, and family size – at different points
in time. The table documents generally low correlations among these various dimensions,
and therefore incoherence within the structure of the Florentine “elite”.40
-- table 3 about here -“Social status” is measured in this table by popolani, defined above as that set of
families whose ancestors first were elected to the Priorate between 1282 and 1342. This
popolani social stratum embodied the republican conception of honor – namely, “service
to the state,” even to the extent of “creators of the [republican] state.” On average this
large stratum of families dominated the culture and politics of Florence during this period
more than did any other, even though their fluctuations were considerable.41
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success of Albizzi-regime elites in constructing a coherent “civic humanist” conception of themselves, the
fact that this had little demographic foundation affects one’s interpretation and appreciation of that cultural
achievement. However, there might have been a social-network foundation – cf. Padgett and Ansell, 1993,
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reconsolidated among families in this stratum after the Ciompi revolt, even though participation diffused.
Padgett and McLean, 2006, 1526, traced the economic fortunes of this stratum, which also rose after the
Ciompi revolt. Below I resolve the tensions between these observations and the elite-fluidity findings in
this article by emphasizing the mimetic as much as the actual power of this group.
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Political stratification is measured in this table, like in figure 5, by the average
per-capita number of Priorate offices held by a family during various thirty-year periods
of examination. The Priorate was a city council of nine members, which turned over
every two months. Hence potentially a large number of families could (and increasingly
did) participate in Florentine governance over time.42 In order to control for the tautology
of larger families having more chances to be elected, each family’s total number of
Priorate offices in each period was standardized like by dividing by family size, as
measured by the average number of that family’s households in adjacent tax censuses.
Economic stratification is measured in this table by each family’s normalized
average tax assessment per household. “Normalization” means dividing the average
wealth/tax assessment per household by the average tax assessment (or wealth
declaration, as the case may be) in each census, across all Florentine families’
households. This procedure induces standardization in a more continuous way than the
discrete “aggregate into strata” approach in figure 4. “Average (normalized) household
wealth” was then calculated for each family, including the two tax censuses before and
after the period under study,43 in order to smooth out statistical noise due to potentially
small numbers of households in any one family.
Demographic stratification is measured in this table by family size – that is, by the
number of households listed in each tax census for each family. Again, family averages
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were calculated over the two tax censuses at the beginning and end of each study period,
in order to smooth out statistical noise.
Table 3 presents the simple correlations among these alternative dimensions of
elite status. The main message contained in the table is the low values of these
correlations. With the exception of popolani and family size, no pair of stratification
measures is correlated at a level greater than the correlation level of r = .2.
Within these generally low correlations, details are consistent with existing
historical knowledge:
(a) The correlation between popolani and family size increased over time,
eventually to the correlation level of r = .25, because the average number of households
within popolani families rose over this period from 3.7 taxed households per family in
1352 to 6.5 households in 1480, as was shown in figure 2. Conversely the average size of
magnate families fell from 9.6 households in 1352 to 6.8 households in 1480.
(b) Popolani disproportionately were elected to city council in 1343-1377 and in
the Albizzi regime of 1403-1433, but they lost power during the Ciompi revolt and
during the Medici regime. What is mildly surprising is that the correlation between
popolani status and political office was not higher than it was in these two periods.
(c) There is a small but consistently negative correlation between political office
and family size because of the operation of the divieto, a law which limited the number of
times any one family could serve on the city council.44
What is most remarkable in these generally low numbers is the absence of
correlation between wealth and everything else – except during the Medici regime, when
44
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the correlations between wealth and political office and between wealth and family size
increased somewhat. Even granted that any vibrant commercial economy induces
volatility in wealth, it is surprising to find a strongly commercial society where wealth is
not the foundation of dominance on other dimensions. But in Florence, politics and
family age contended with wealth as alternative markers of elite status.
As unusual as these low correlations may be comparatively,45 the statistical
evidence about elite incoherence in table 3 is consistent with the lively contemporary
contestation and debate in Renaissance Florence about the meaning of fundamental
hierarchical words like “nobility” and “honor.”46

6. MARRIAGE AMONG FLORENTINE FAMILIES
So far the evidence presented in this article has supported interpretations of
Renaissance Florentine history that emphasize social fluidity among lineages: (1) Despite
considerable resistance in marriage, social mobility in wealth, in politics, in last names,
and during the Albizzi regime even in marriage was substantial. This mobility induced
considerable turnover and churning in the stratification of Florentine families. (2) So
much so that Florentine elites were cross-cutting and inconsistent in their multiple
hierarchical orderings. Yet the lineage “atoms” underneath this collective churning were
remarkably stable, compared to northern European noble families. What were the
mechanisms that produced this apparent paradox of lineage stability and high rates of
relative family mobility? In the rest of this article, I shall look underneath aggregate
45
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trends to search for answers to this question – first by examining statistical determinants
of marriage and then by examining statistical determinants of growth in lineage size.
Table 4 presents the results of a statistical analysis of Florentine marriages, over a
two-century time span. The dependent variable being explained by the variables reported
in the rows of table 2 is the number of directional marriages taking place between two
families, during the time period identified in the columns. The unit of analysis is familypairs, not families per se. Zero-inflated Poisson regression47 is the correct variant of
multiple-regression analysis to use, given the count structure of this dyadic data. This
means (a) that for each time period under study,48 the set of all families with at least one
observed marriage was assembled, (b) that all pairings of such families were constructed,
(c) and a count was made of how many marriages occurred between each pair of families
during the examination period – zero, one, two, three, etc. Care was taken to distinguish
the gendered directionality of marriage – namely, the number of marriages between the
groom’s family and the bride’s family was different (usually) from number of marriages
between the same two families with bride-and-groom roles reversed. Poisson regression
is appropriate for count data. “Zero-inflated” is a two-stage logit-regression correction
used for datasets, like this one, in which the vast majority of family pairs had an observed
count of zero.
-- table 4 about here -47

Long, 1997, 242-47.
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unlikely to be off by thirty years, or even by fifteen. Thus given the data, macro trends over centuries can
be studied reliably, whereas estimating year-by-year fluctuations has measurement error (as do all data).
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Details of independent-variable construction (likewise dyadic in nature) are
presented in the footnotes of table 4. When these independent variables’ values ranged
from zero to one (the case with most variables), the numerical values of their coefficients
are comparable, but otherwise they are not. More important are the significance levels
reported in table 4, denoted by asterisks.49 Sometimes numerical values of estimated
regression coefficients can be high, without achieving statistical significance. This
usually means that the number of observed cases underlying that coefficient was too low
for reliable inference. Readers should pay attention, therefore, only to reported
coefficients with statistical significance.
Passing over the three variables listed first in the table, which statistically control
for the otherwise potentially confounding issues of family-size tautology50 and sample
bias,51 the first substantive finding of interest is the effect of family size itself. Above and
beyond the tautological fact that large families were more likely to marry each other
simply because they had more sons and daughters, large Florentine lineages were more
likely to marry each other. This was not statistically true in every period, but in four out
of six observed periods it was true. This non-tautological effect of family size, especially
coupled with the tautological effect of family size, implies that large patrilineages formed
a dense cluster of intermarrying families at the center of the Florentine marriage network.
One reason for not discarding the concept of “elite” altogether, in spite of its incoherence
49
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problems, is the patrilinege itself. Patrilineage family structure within large Florentine
families was perhaps the most essential mechanism that concentrated and channeled
Florentine intermarriage into a dense marriage-network core in the first place.
Patrilineage, in other words, was the social glue that held the Florentine marriage
network together at its core, in the face of strong centrifugal forces of economic and
political mobility threatening to tear it apart.
The second set of significant findings concerns social strata:
(a) After 1348 but not before, magnate families strongly intermarried. This
remained true even after the Medici in 1434 removed their legal status, and after the
magnates declined demographically because of splintering (see figure 2 above). After the
Black Death, Florentine magnates were like a deposed aristocracy, which history had
passed by, but whose proud but archaic collective memory of their own history remained
strong. Conversely, back in the beginning of their founding, from 1293 to 1343, when
magnate families were still strong and threatening, they did not tightly marry each other.
Rather they continued to intermarry with their titular enemies, the popolani.52
(b) As lineage branches splintered off their magnate roots,53 usually adopting a
new last name in the process, the marriage behavior of these ex-magnates altered. The
direction of alteration was not toward endogamy with some other social-class group.
Rather ex-magnates became almost54 social-class blind in their intermarriage behavior.
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(c) “New men,” defined in this particular table as the union of new men and newnew men,55 were also endogamous in the periods 1318-1347 and 1378-1403. Even more
pronounced, however, was the mutual marriage antipathy between them and the
magnates and even the ex-magnates. This social-class aversion reached levels of
statistical significance in the two periods 1348-1403, but a milder form of it is detectable
throughout the two centuries under study, via the negative-coefficient signs in the
regressions.
(d) Perhaps the most surprising finding among these social-strata coefficients is a
counter-intuitive finding of non-significance: The highest social stratum, namely the
popolani, never exhibited at any time any social-strata preference in their marriage
behavior, either endogamy among themselves or exogamy regarding anyone else.
Instead, the marriage behavior of popolani families was statistically random with respect
to social strata. According to republican standards of the time, popolani families were the
highest prestige group in Florence, having founded the republic, yet in their marriages
popolani families never enacted the very dimension that put them on top. This is a
puzzle: “popolani” was a strong linguistic concept in Florentine political discourse, at
least before the Medici era, yet it is a term without marriage-network behavioral content.
On this dimension, there was a mismatch between Florentine cognitive selfunderstanding and Florentine network behavior.56
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To summarize, in marriage, social class was a status dimension kept alive by the
strong antipathy between magnate and new-men social strata. Behaviorally, the highest
prestige popolani stood not above but in between the magnates and the new men,
bridging the polarized class differences beneath them. This network-bridging function of
popolani families in marriage may help to explain how they credibly could have
positioned themselves not as a self-interested oligarchy but rather as public-spirited
“citizens of Florence,” at least during some periods in their history.57.
The statistical effects of neighborhood on intermarriage are simple to describe.
Measured either at the fine-grained (sixteen-unit) level of gonfaloni or at the coarsergrained (four-unit) level of quarter, the effect of neighborhood propinquity on
intermarriage was consistently significant.58 The magnitude of this effect, however,
steadily declined over the two-century period under study. In the first two periods of our
study, 1282-1317 and 1318-1347, the statistical effects of neighborhood on intermarriage
are the strongest of all in those regressions.59 In addition to having patrilineage at its core,
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early periods family “neighborhood” was measured from the 1352 tax census and then projected backward.
Before 1343, the administrative map of Florence was divided into six (sesti), instead of into sixteen
(gonfaloni) and four (quarters). Thus it is impossible to measure gonfaloni residence from contemporary
documents before 1343. Neighborhood measurement based on 1352, with the heroic assumption of no
residential mobility, is the best that one can do for earlier years. The fact that neighborhood coefficients are
so strong in table 4, in spite of this shaky assumption, implies (a) that geographical mobility really was
quite low, especially for patrilineages with large medieval houses-cum-towers, and (b) that the true effect
of neighborhood propinquity on Florentine marriage was even higher than reported in table 4.
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in other words, the marriage network in late medieval Florence was geographically
segmentary. As the Renaissance proceeded, however, the geographical foundation of the
Florentine marriage network gradually dissolved, until it became barely detectable in the
time of Lorenzo de’ Medici.60
Moving now to the status dimension of wealth, the results again are easy to state.
Namely, in all periods of possible observation, from the 1352 to the 1480 tax censuses,
Florentine families were sharply endogamous on the dimension of wealth. Wealthy
families married other wealthy families. Furthermore, the wealthier the family, the more
intense was the marriage endogamy according to wealth. These conclusions are based on
the following coefficients in table 4: (a) consistently significant endogamy coefficients
for families both in top 10% of wealth and in top 10-25% of wealth; (b) higher magnitude
and significance coefficients for families in the top 10% of wealth than for families in the
top 10-25% of wealth; (c) strong and significant negative/aversive coefficients for
intermarriage between families in top 25% of wealth and families in bottom 50% of
wealth. Molho combined a number of criteria in his composite definition of “ruling
class”, but the most important criteria he used was wealth, as measured in the 1427, the
1458, and the 1480 catasti.61 To the extent that wealth was the dimension driving
Molho’s statistical results, his study and mine agree that the Florentine “elite” practiced
endogamy in marriage.62
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Continuing in the economic vein, another battery of variables in table 4
investigates the relationship between marriage and economic industrial structure – in
particular, the effect of business partnerships on marriage between partners’ families.
Strong empirical correlations between business partnership and intermarriage between
the families of partners are found across multiple industries only for the one period of
1403-1433. This is consistent with the “catalysis” half of Padgett and McLean’s
explanation for the invention of the partnership system.63 This Albizzi-regime correlation
between marriage and partnership systems both reinforced the economic reproduction of
that new mode of making companies, and it blended an economic logic into marriage,
making it natural to use dowries as startup capital for firms.64 It was during the Albizzi
regime, in other words, that commerce and marriage were most seamlessly fused into a
merchant-republican elite, possibly under the ideological umbrella of civic-humanism.
This fusion had consequences both for marriage and for industrial structure.
Turning now to politics, two sets of political variables are investigated in table 4 –
the effect of political office-holding on the likelihood of intermarriage, and the effect of
political factions on intermarriage. On the status dimension of political office-holding,
the consistent finding in table 4 is no marriage endogamy within the reggimento of
previous office holders. This statistical non-finding for reggimento is similar to the nonfinding for popolani. Two aspects of the top office of Priorate or city council were

(inconsistent) measures of “elite” into a composite index, as in Molho, 1994, 205-7, was a mistake, in my
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investigated – namely, that of family office-holding during the interval of the regression
(contemporary “power”), and that of cumulative number of offices held by the family
since the 1282 creation of the Priorate (historic “state service”). Office-holding in the
Mercanzia or commercial court is also investigated in table 4. Only one out of the 28
political-office coefficients was statistically significant, which is negligible. It will
perhaps surprise political historians of Florence as much as it did me that a statistical
relationship between marriage and political office-holding did not exist in republican
Florence, after controlling for other variables. Impressions to the contrary are created by
spurious correlations of both marriage and political office with other factors that affect
both, such as family size.
The political variables that did affect marriage, however, and dramatically so,
were political factions – especially victorious political factions. Statistically significant
effects on marriage of political factions formed during crisis events are observed for
astonishingly long periods after those events had passed. For example, the Ciompi revolt
of 1378 remained seared into Florentine elites’ collective memory and marriage behavior
for 100 years. The victorious counter-revolutionary alliance65 of families that crushed the
Ciompi revolt was statistically endogamous during the periods 1348-1377, 1378-1403,
1404-1433, and even a bit66 into 1434-1463. In other words, the tumultuous events of the
Ciompi revolt remained inscribed into the Florentine marriage networks of the victors for
one hundred years.
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A similarly long-lasting shadow was inscribed into Florentine marriage networks
by the Guelf struggle in 1301 between Blacks and Whites. Institutionally reinforced by
the Parte Guelfa, the victorious Black Guelf families67 of 1301 were endogamous in
marriage during the periods 1282-1317, 1318-1347, 1348-1377, and 1378-1403. Again
intermarriage data reveal behavioral evidence of about a one-hundred-year memory of
searing political events of the past, among the victors.
In contrast to the Ciompi revolt and to the equally bitter struggle between Blacks
and Whites, the political contest between the Albizzi and the Ricci factions68 in 13481377 was not so severe as to leave observable traces in marriage, either during that
period or later, after controlling for other correlated disputes.
Finally, during the Medici regime, Medicean political partisans69 underwent an
interesting evolution in their marriage behavior. Under Cosimo de’ Medici, Medician
partisans were not endogamous in marriage. This finding is consistent with the unusually
centralized political-party structure of Cosimo, analyzed in Padgett and Ansell. But they
became endogamous under Lorenzo de’ Medici, partly under Lorenzo’s own brokerage.70
Medici partisans, in other words, were originally open in marriage to outsiders, but then
they closed into themselves, perhaps in response to the Pazzi revolt.
Viewed cross-sectionally, all these effects on marriage are variables in a statistical
analysis. Viewed temporally, however, these statistical effects are layers of history
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superimposed on each other.71 These two perspectives are not as incompatible as they
might seem. The former can be a method for uncovering the latter, just as the latter can
be an interpretive tool for understanding the results of the former. Florentine marriage
networks registered the collective memory of contemporary Florentines on many scales
of temporality at once – conscious, institutional, and ultimately even biological.72
More specifically, the findings in table 4 identify the not-always-consistent
historical cross-currents underlying Florentine marriage networks. With regard to
political office and to the popolani social stratum, the Florentine marriage system was
remarkably open to the smooth and continuous incorporation of newcomers. With regard
to wealth and political factionalism, victorious elites tried to “close the door behind
themselves” through endogamous intermarriage, temporarily cutting off future inmobility. But these elite-closure efforts ultimately failed, since history kept moving on,
creating yet another rising wealthy cohort, yet another factional cleavage. As a result the
Florentine marriage network tended to lurch, over 30-year regime units of time, from one
endogamous core to another, subjecting the elite system as a whole to repeated shocks.
Patrilineage structure itself was the main stabilizing force fighting against continuous,
episodic churning. For new families, the attainment of a recognized last name was
perhaps the only mobility victory that was permanent. For older families, large Florentine
patrilineages continued to try to support each other in marriage, not always successfully,
whatever tumultuous forces beset them.
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7. GROWTH AND DECLINE OF FLORENTINE FAMILIES
What difference did these mobility and marriage dynamics make for the
demographic success or failure of Florentine families? Table 5 reports the results of a
statistical analysis of family growth or decline, between the various tax censuses at my
disposal. “Family growth/decline” is simply the difference in numbers of tax households
registered for each family in the successive tax censuses. Since these differences ranged
from -13 to +15, normally distributed around zero, ordinary least-squares regression was
the statistical method employed. Details of independent-variable construction are
reported in the footnotes to table 5.
-- table 5 about here -The overall picture is that three factors drove the demographic growth or decline
of Florentine families during the Renaissance: (a) wealth, (b) political factional success,
and (c) being within the marriage-network core.73 Political participation, in the sense of
Priorate membership, and social identity of wife, above and beyond her family’s being in
the marriage-network core, were irrelevant to a family’s demographic success.
The conjunction of the effect of marriage-core on family growth in table 5 and the
effect of family size on marriage endogamy in table 4 implies that there was a positive
feedback of demographic success at the heart of the Florentine kinship system – large
patrilineages intermarrying, breeding growing patrilineages, who intermarried, etc. To the
extent that there was any stable elite at all in the face of widespread economic and
political turnover, it was this inner motor of patrilineage that generated it.
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In addition to marriage-core, a family’s average household wealth at the
beginning of each period mattered for the subsequent demographic fortune of that family
at the end of each period. Simple material ability to support larger numbers of children is
perhaps sufficient to account for this statistical effect.74 But probably more subtle
mechanisms of dowry and of marriage attractiveness were also involved. Whatever the
detailed mechanisms, a positive feedback of wealth thus also existed, along side of
patrilineage – namely, wealthy families intermarrying, breeding growing families, who
intermarried, etc. Whereas the patrilineage feedback on average was a force for
stabilizing old families within the core, the wealth feedback on average was a force for
injecting new and growing families into the core, even though its “intent” was wealthy
families closing ranks. Patrilineage and wealth were both forces for social closure (on
different dimensions), but not being correlated they worked at cross-purposes.
Political factional success also resulted in growing families – examples are the
Black Guelfs even as late as 1352-1378, the Albizzi faction in 1352-1378 and in 13781403, the Ricci faction in 1378-1403, the anti-Ciompi in 1403-1427 and even as late as
1427-1458, the pro-Ciompi in 1352-1378, the Albizzi oligarchs in 1403-1427, and the
Mediceans in 1403-1427, in 1427-1458 and in 1458-1480. Political exiles are well
documented in Florentine historiography,75 but from a broad demographic perspective,
the consequences of political success on family growth are more evident in table 5 than
are the consequences of political failure on family decline.76 Since these political-faction
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results are also matched in the marriage results in table 4, their conjunction points to yet a
third positive feedback in Florentine kinship – namely, political victors intermarrying,
breeding growing families, who intermarried, etc. The main difference between this third
feedback logic and the other two was that the patrilineage and wealth logics operated
consistently throughout the time period under study, whereas the definition of “political
victors” lurched in composition from one political crisis to the next. Even though
“political victor” was always a salient dimension of stratification among Florentine
lineages, the content of this kept shifting through periodic political crises. Of all the
political crises, the Black-White Guelf, the Ciompi revolt, and the Medici ascendance
were the most consequential for Florentine intermarriage and lineage growth.77
Other than these three drivers of family growth, the results in table 5 imply largefamily-size decline: (a) having a large family size, absent renewal from one of the three
feedback logics, led to a decline in that family’s size, and (b) magnate (and to lesser
extent ex-magnate) families declined. These ‘entropy’ trends were also evident in figure
2, which plotted average family sizes over time, broken down by social class. In figure 2
it was evident that the largest medieval-era magnate families suffered dramatic shrinkage
in size, through splintering and other mechanisms, during the period under study,78
whereas all other social classes grew in their average family sizes. Figure 2 attributes this
shrinkage in very large family sizes specifically to magnates, but table 5 reveals that the
phenomenon also involved others, even if magnates epitomized the large-family
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demographic problem. Demographically successful Florentine families could not
passively rest on their past laurels if they wanted to survive.79 They needed actively to
participate in one or more of the three positive-feedback logics of patrilineage-plusmarriage-core, of wealth, or of victorious political faction in order to maintain their
demographic strength in the face of entropy.
Absent inherited membership in the marriage core, two routes were available for
new families to grow – wealth and political faction. Social mobility and demographic
growth were two of the incentives for new men to enter politics, in spite of the
subordinate clientage position in which this entry placed them at first. Figure 5 reveals
that, indeed, on average these social-mobility mechanisms led to demographic success for
newcomers. By 1500, popolani, new-men, new-new-men, and Medici-era families had
grown in their average household sizes to almost eliminate the dramatic social-class
differentiation in family sizes that had existed in 1352 and before. In terms of raw
numbers of distinct families, the popolani experienced a decline, new-men families
remained constant, and new-new men and Medici-era families grew.80
All these trends together (see also figure 1) point to the diffusion of previously
upper-class patrilineage ideals down from older medieval consorterie into the middleclass ranks of Florentine society. The irony is that the demographic content of these same
ideals simultaneously was disintegrating within those older medieval-era families that

79

Alberti, 1971, 27-34, presents one famous description of what such decline felt like to participants.

80

The respective numbers, from 1352 to 1480, are these: popolani from 276 to 184, new men from 163 to

156, new-new men from 103 to 165, and medici-era from 46 to 117.

42
had first created it.81 To conceptualize diffusion and growth with a collapse at the center,
the imperfect metaphor of a volcano comes to mind: Patrilineage aspiration was the lava
pushing up many nouveaux families to congeal, even as it induced the true model to
which they were aspiring to collapse. In my assessment, Goldthwaite, 1968, and Kent,
1977, essentially were both correct in their debate about the historic decline or not of
patrilineage in Florence, because of the co-existence of these apparently contradictory
trends of patrilineage diffusion and collapse.

8. INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF FLORENTINE FAMILIES
So far in this article, lineages and last-named families have been treated as unitary
entities, in order to maintain a longue durée focus on macroscopic dynamics and trends.
This is a simplification for analytical purposes. I turn now, however, to looking inside the
lineage “atoms” in order to see if there was any change on average in the internal
structure and function of Florentine lineages over this time period.
The point of departure for this assessment of internal change within lineages is the
debate between Goldthwaite and Kent. Using mostly economic evidence, Goldthwaite,
1968, provocatively argued that Florentine patrilineages progressively disintegrated into
nuclear families over the course of the Renaissance. Using mostly non-economic
evidence, Kent, 1977, forcefully denied that claim. Both sides of this extended debate
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focused on fine-grained examinations of small numbers of “representative” families.82 In
this section, I present evidence that suggests that both sides to this debate were correct.
A broad statistical approach like that in this article and in Herlihy and KlapischZuber cannot hope to match the level of detail possible in case studies, such as those of
Goldthwaite and Kent. But some light can be cast on the Florentine evolution of internal
family structure by aggregate statistics, even if only at a coarse-grained level of
resolution. In exchange for loss of detail and texture, what is gained is global information
on trends in the population as a whole.
“Family solidarity” is a complex concept with many aspects. But one indicator
that is measurable with the statistics at my disposal is how densely the various
households in a family lived together. Figure 7 presents data over time, subdivided by
social strata, on the percentage of families’ households that lived in the same (i.e., the
modal) gonfalone neighborhood. Gonfaloni were the sixteen administrative wards into
which the city was subdivided.83 These are the geographical units itemized in the tax
censuses. (The exception was the 1403 prestanza, which reported residence only at the
quarter level of aggregation; hence the gap in figure 7.)
-- figure 7 about here -Consistent with the argument of Kent, Florentine families generally increased in
their residential concentration during the Renaissance. The exception, as always, was the
magnates, whose demographic disintegration is reflected in their residential
82
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deconcentration as well – from the highest residential concentration of all classes in 1352
to the lowest in 1480. In 1352, consistent with late-medieval patterns, high-status
popolani and magnate lineages were the most geographically concentrated, in spite of
their large sizes, whereas lower-status new men, new-new men, and Medici-era families
were the least concentrated, in spite of their smaller sizes. By 1480, however, all social
classes except magnates had converged to the very high level of 75-80% of families’
households living in the same gonfalone. This increase in residential concentration
occurred mostly during the Medici regime. This is further confirmation of the earlier
conclusion that patrilineage ideals were diffusing out into Renaissance Florence, even as
the original sponsors of those ideals were collapsing.
Further information on the internal constitution of Renaissance Florentine
families, in the functional domains of economics and politics, is provided in figures 8a,
8b, 9 and 10. Figures 8a and 8b present data on the connection between family and
business – namely, what percentages of Florentine business partnerships were formed
between patrilineal kin. Figure 8a presents annual-census data on partnerships among
domestic bankers, originally collected by the Arte del Cambio or banking guild. Figure
8b presents sketchy but available data on other industries – international merchant
traders, wool manufacturers, and silk manufacturers – collected from a variety of ad hoc
sources, listed in the bibliography.
-- figures 8a and 8b about here -Consistent with the argument of Goldthwaite, both figures 8a and 8b show the
withdrawal of Florentine families-qua-families from the constitution of business
partnerships. Around 1300, an astonishingly high 70-75% of cambio-banking
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partnerships were constructed out of paternal kin – fathers, sons, brothers, uncles, or
cousins of varying degree. Over the first half of the 1300s, this percentage dropped
gradually to about 40%, at which level it remained until 1460, after which it declined
further to 20-30%. As shown in figure 8b, the international merchant-banking industry,
located for the most part in the Arte della Calimala, shows an even more dramatic drop:
about 60-80% of partners in international merchant-banking companies were paternal kin
until the Ciompi revolt in 1378, after which suddenly only 35-40% were. This sharp
organizational change was due to the invention of the partnership system, analyzed in
Padgett and McLean, 2006. Unfortunately no data prior to 1382 exist to document
partnership structures in the wool- and silk-manufacturing industries from their
beginnings.84 But data from that date forward are consistent with the fourteenth-century
withdrawal of family from business partnership in those industries as well.85
Space does not permit a discussion of these organizational developments in
economic history.86 But the consequence for Florentine family structure was that during
the 1300s business became less and less an important reason for the maintenance of
paternal kinship. This is not to deny that family businesses even at the end of the 1400s
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were not far more prevalent than they are today. But family-business percentages of the
magnitudes of the early 1300s had disappeared.
One consequence of this family withdrawal from business was increased
inequality in wealth among the households within families. When many family members
were in business together, their economic fortunes tended to rise and fell together. But as
economic activities diverged among different households within the family, so did their
economic fortunes. Figure 9 plots Herfindahl indices87 for wealth concentration, averaged
across families of various social strata. Low values indicate relatively egalitarian
distributions of household wealth within lineages; high values indicate relatively unequal
distributions of household wealth within lineages.88 Except for magnates, always the
exception, inequality in household wealth increased within lineages in all social strata in
Florence – particularly in the 1352-1378 period.89
-- figure 9 about here -Rising inequality of wealth was not the same as rising “individualism” in family
households,90 because other evidence shows that patrilineal behavior intensified.
Evidence suggests that wealthy branches of the family often helped their poorer cousins
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financially.91 But regardless of this intra-lineage financial assistance, the gap between
wealthy and poorer branches of patrilineages increased during the Renaissance.
Finally Herfindahl indices for inequality in political office, specifically in Priorate
office-holding, are presented in figure 10. Here, “inequality” means one or a few headsof-household monopolizing the Priorate seats of the entire family in the time period
(assuming that there was more than one seat). “Equality” in contrast means that the
family’s Priorate seats in the period were widely distributed across its household heads.
-- figure 10 about here -The data in figure 10 shows exactly the opposite trend in political office-holding
as was seen in wealth in figure 9. Namely, intra-family inequality in political officeholding suddenly decreased after the 1378 Ciompi revolt – and stayed that way. This
temporal trend could have been caused by institutional reasons, by cultural ones, or by a
combination of the two. Whatever the mechanism, fifteenth-century Florentine families,
but not fourteenth-century Florentine families, exhibited a careful balance in their
distribution of offices within themselves.92
Collectively figures 8 through 10 suggest a change in the economic and political
function of lineage within Florentine society – less important in economics, but more
important in politics.93 The Goldthwaite-Kent debate, in other words, can be usefully
reframed from the issue of lineage “decline” to the issue of changing lineage function.
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9. CONCLUSION
Social mobility in relative rankings among lineages in Renaissance Florence was
high – especially in wealth and in political office, but also during the Albizzi regime in
marriage hierarchy. A vibrant commercial economy and a turbulent political history lay
at the base of this social mobility, but these economic and political histories were
translated into family history through inconsistency among three contending statusstratification principles: wealth, winning political faction, and patrilineage size. Norms of
marriage endogamy applied to each of these three status dimensions, but because these
dimensions were empirically unrelated, endogamy on one dimension implied exogamy
on the other dimensions, on average. Efforts to consolidate their own family positions
forced “elites” (defined on any of the three dimensions) to reach down to marry middletier families, recruiting them as in-laws. These cross-strata marriages, in turn, became one
factor feeding back to keep economic and political histories dynamic, at least for the
duration of republicanism.
How can this open-elite conclusion square with the dominant portrait of elitism
and oligarchy prevalent in Florentine historiography today? In brief, my answer is
through mimesis: “di Puccio,” “di ser Ristoro,” and “di ser Gino” became Pucci,
Serristori, and Ginori, respectively. New men tried to become patricians, and buried (or
reinvented) their actual pasts.
While I disagreed with Molho on some particulars, I agreed with his fundamental
point that it was through marriage that patrician Florentine lineages, old or new,
successfully preserved their demographic existence through perilous times. But
“endogamy” did not mean a self-enclosed group. There were three independent causal
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feedbacks linking marriage and demographic success – marrying for money, marrying for
power, and marrying for lineage size. Florentine lineages had to maneuver among these
inconsistent cross-currents in order to achieve upward-mobility success. Or more to the
point, they had to so maneuver in order to avoid otherwise almost inevitable downward
mobility and extinction. The strong negative-growth coefficient on family size in table 5
supported Herlihy’s contention94 that large upper-strata houses faced strong socialmobility pressure downward due to high birth rates, in the absence of aversive action to
the contrary. Florentine magnates were prominent examples. But usually Florentine
citizens were adept enough in their balancing of heterogeneous marriages across status
dimensions to successfully preserve their lineages.
With regard to middle-strata new men, Najemy has made the cogent argument95
that electoral reforms – episodically throughout the Trecento, but particularly after the
Ciompi revolt – expanded the franchise, thereby co-opting complaisant new men into
patrician-dominated republican power structures. I am making a similar argument in the
domain of social history. Through exogamous marriage, the patrilineage family ideal of
patricians diffused downward into the Florentine population. I add, however, the point
that this diffusion pressure was so strong that it dissolved the marriage-network content
of the dominant-class categories of popolani and reggimento. It was not so much the
popolani class that dominated, as it was the popolani ideal that dominated. Through both
electoral and marriage co-optation, new men adopted the family ideals of their popolani
status superiors.
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The focus of this article has not been on the position of women in Florence, about
which there is an active historiography.96 But to the extent that patriarchal values were
associated with patrilineage family systems,97 then the analysis in this article sheds some
indirect light on why Joan Kelly answered no to her famous question “Did Women have
a Renaissance?”98 Namely, the patrilineage model diffused to wider segments of the
Florentine population during the Renaissance. In the perspective of this article, this
diffusion of patriarchy was not just the reactionary reassertion of sexism. Rather it was an
unfortunate corollary of high social fluidity in the (male) society.
Finally, there are two ways in which the findings in this article depend upon the
institutional framework of republicanism – cognitive comparability and political
factionalism. At the household level of analysis, Herlihy argued that medieval households
throughout Europe gradually became comparable across social strata, through the spread
of peasant agriculture and through the Church’s homogeneous policies on incest and
marriage.99 A similar point at the level of lineage can be made about republican
elections.100 As more and more males became eligible for citizenship and election, more
and more families adopted the family organizational form of the archetypal citizens.
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Political and social co-optation mechanisms worked hand in hand. As adaptation of
Florentine lineages to republican electoral reforms proceeded, moreover, the function or
“purpose” of lineage, while always mixed, appears to have shifted from predominantly
military101 to predominantly economic to predominantly political.
Political turmoil was crucial not only for the definition of winning political
faction, but also for the maintenance of low correlation among Florence’s three status
dimensions. With political stability, one can expect that the dimensions of economic
wealth and political power will become more aligned. In the case of republican Florence,
however, periodic political crises induced sharp lurches in the composition of winning
political factions, and thereby in the marriage-network core. Such crises were not entirely
the exogenous shocks they appear to be, because these political crises may have been
induced in part by social fluidity in the first place.102
The lurch from the Black Guelf “oligarchy” to the anti-Ciompi “oligarchy” after
the Ciompi revolt of 1378 was responsible for the greatest volume of elite fluidity
observed in the two-century time period of this study.103 The regime instituted by Cosimo
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de’ Medici in 1434 consolidated mimetic new men through political absorption, and it
initiated the protracted process of imposing factional stability. While political turmoil
continued for three decades beyond the end of my data, thus began the gradual extinction
of the “Renaissance” social-mobility processes documented here.104
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Figure 1. Percentage of tax-census households in lineages and with last names
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Archival sources: Estimo 306 (for 1352), Prestanze 367-69 (for 1379), Estimo 268 (for
1379), Prestanze 1989-2020 (for 1403), Catasto 64-85 (for 1427), Prestanze 834-37 (for
1458), Molho and Kirshner (for 1480).
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Figure 2. Average family size (i.e., number of households in families), by social strata
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Source: Padgett relational database, using archival sources listed in note to figure 1.
Social strata classifications based on date of first Prior information contained in
Newberry Library, Priorista descritto a Tratte riscontro con quello delle riformagioni e
con alter scritture publiche.
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Figure 3. Total numbers of New Families Admitted to the Florentine Priorate, 1282-1532

Data source: Najemy, 1982, 320-23.
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Figure 4. Family stability in Wealth
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Sources: A.S.F., Manoscritto 496 (for 1325), plus archival sources listed in note to figure
1.
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Figure 5. Family stability in Priorate participation
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Sources: Newberry Library priorista, plus archival sources listed in note to figure 1.
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Figure 6. Family stability in Marriage hierarchy

Percentage of families who stay in same marriage
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Family persistence in Marriage hierarchy
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1318-1347 to
1348-1377

1348-1377 to
1378-1403

1378-1403 to
1404-1433

within core (= cohesion of 4+)

1404-1433 to
1434-1463

1434-1463 to
1464-1493

within bi-component (= cohesion of 2+)

Sources: A.S.F., Manoscritti Carte dell’Ancisa 348-361, plus genealogies in secondary
sources listed in bibliography.
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Figure 7. Residential concentration, by social strata
Family Neighborhood Concentration
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Sources: Padgett relational database, using tax censuses listed in note to figure 1.
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Figure 8a. Family basis of economic partnerships
Family Partners in Cambio banks
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Figure 8b. Family basis of economic partnerships
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Sources: A.S.F., Arte della Lana 46 (for 1382), Carte Strozziani V 22 (for ~1485); Dei
1984 (p. 126 for 1472), Melis 1962 (tavole 27, 28, 31, 32, 35, 36, 39 and 40 for ~1395),
Molho 1970 (for 1451), Padgett 2005a (for 1300-1380), 2005b (for 1427), Silva 1908
(pp. 679-83 for 1369), Strozzi account book (for ~1485).
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Figure 9. Wealth inequality within Florentine families, by social strata
Wealth Concentration within patrilineages, across households
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Sources: Padgett relational database, using tax censuses listed in note to figure 1.
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Figure 10. Political-office inequality within Florentine families, by social strata

average herfindahl index (normalized)
of Priorate membership within families with
more than one Priorate member
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Sources: Newberry Library priorista, plus tax censuses itemized in note to figure 1.
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Table 1. Survival rates of lineages, by social strata
Number of lineages: 1352 1379 1403 1427 1458 1480
Magnates

77

76

75

73

64

60

Popolani

249

239

220

212

182

164

New men

119

175

166

154

141

129

New-new men

94

146

206

226

199

181

Medici-era

41

67

92

112

127

127

Never admitted

93

155

188

224

211

172

673

858

947 1001

924

833

Magnates: 1352-1458 =

64 / 77

=

83.1%

Popolani: 1352-1458 =

182 / 249

=

73.1%

New men: 1379-1480 =

129 / 175

=

73.7%

Total

100-year survival rates:

Table 2. Birth of new lineages, by social strata
Number of lineages: 1352- 1379- 1403- 1427- 14581379

1403

1427

1458

1480

Magnates
Popolani
New men

55

New-new men

49

50

24

Medici-era

29

23

19

15

4

Never admitted

65

45

48

16

3

198

118

91

31

7

Total

Table 3. Intercorrelations of Social class, Wealth, Political office, and Family size
Correlation between:

13481377

13781403

14041433

14341463

14641493

Popolani and Family size

.1206

.1497

.2026

.2121

.2481

Popolani and Political office

.1577

.0707

.1558

.0435

-.0237

Popolani and Wealth

.0342

-.0017

.0022

.0781

.0892

Wealth and Political office

.1009

.0515

.0833

.1715

.1944

Wealth and Family size

.0333

.0091

.0238

.1498

.1733

Political office and Family size

-.0737

-.1014

-.0261

-.0305

-.0396

N.B. (a) “Popolani” is a 0/1 dummy variable, depending upon whether family’s ancestor was first admitted to Priorate during period
from 1282 to 1342, and was not declared to be magnate in 1293. Popolani were the most prestigious social stratum in Florence.
(b) Per capita “wealth” is defined here as normalized average wealth (for 1427, 1480) or tax assessment (for 1352, 1378, 1403, and
1458) per household in each patrilineage. “Normalized” means that for each census each family’s average household wealth or tax
assessment was divided by the mean overall wealth or tax assessment in my coded data, in order to make otherwise diverse monetary
scales comparable across censuses. “Average” is defined both over all households in each last-named family and over available tax
censuses [i.e., the tax censuses of 1352, 1379, 1403, 1427, 1458, and 1480] at beginning and end of period.
(c) Per capita “political office” is defined here as number of Priorate offices held per household in each last-named family, during the
period listed. “Per household” means dividing total number of Priorate offices held by a family by that family’s average number of tax
households.
(d) “Family size” is defined here as average number of tax households in each last-named family. “Average” here and throughout was
defined over available tax censuses at beginning and end of period.

Table 5. OLS Regressions on growth or decline in Family Size:
“Family size growth/decline” = (Number of family’s tax households in later tax census) –
(Number of family’s tax households in early tax census)
13521379

13791403

14031427

14271458

14581480

.5279

1.4478***

.3365

2.0277***

.4105

Family size

-.1003***

-.3515***

-.1190***

-.2594***

-.0924***

Magnate
Ex-magnate
Popolani
New men
New-new men
Medici-era

.4686
-.6975
-.0385
.7510*
.6602*
.5988

-1.0371*
-.3343
.1969
.0709
.3240
.1362

-.0235
.4260
.2027
.4932(*)
.8087**
.2968

-.7143
-.9027*
-.2686
-.3171
-.2323
.3338

-.6317
.1442
-.0856
.2259
-.2555
.1440

.2654***
.0426

.1583**
-.1194

.3083***
.0154

-.0810
.1381

.8160**
-.1134
.1989
.5232

1.2561***
.3328
-.3310
.1346

.8253***
.1593
.3701
-.4346

.5258*
-.1338
.2246
.7552(*)

.9081**
.0432
1.5758***
.0969
1.5153***
.6682*

1.0136**
-.0014
.0149
.1987
1.6840***
.9036**

.6385
-.6454*
-.4297
.4641
1.0442**
-.0318

861
.0000
.1621

877
.0000
.2920

812
.0000
.0808

constant

Avg. Hshd. Wealth .1547*
Avg. Priorate partic. -.0997
Marriage core
% Popolani wives
% Wealthy wives
% Priorate wives

.7121*
.2995
-.5752
.2960

Black guelfs (1301) 1.3349**
White guelfs (1301) .4053
Albizzi faction
1.4738**
Ricci faction
.4577
Anti-ciompi (1378) .4376
Pro-ciompi (1378)
.8682**
Oligarchs (1434)
Mediceans (1434)
Mediceans (1449)
Anti-mediceans (1466)
# observations
Prob > F
R2

724
.0000
.1092
***

.2972
.3576
1.1573**
1.1063**
-.0726
-.4731*

817
.0000
.4238

= (p < .001); ** = (p < .01); * = (p < .05); (*) = (p < .06)
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Notes to table 5:
(1) “Family size” is each last-named family’s number of households in the tax census at
beginning of period.
(2) “Average Household Wealth” is ordinal clustering of average household wealth of
families into quartiles: 1 = top 10%, 2 = 10-25%, 3 = 25-50%, 4 = 50-75%, 5 = 75-100%,
at beginning of period. [In table, I reverse signs from computer output to be more
intuitive, because “richest” is lowest number in these ordinal codings.]
(3) “Average Priorate participation” is ordinal clustering of average household Priorate
participation into 1 = (x ≥ 1), 2 = (1 > x ≥ .5), 3 = (.5 > x > 0), and 4 = (x=0), during the
period. [In table, I reverse signs from computer output to be more intuitive, because
“most powerful” is lowest number in these ordinal codings.]
(4) “Marriage core” is the set of families in the inner core of the marriage network of that
period. “Core” is defined as those families with structural cohesion of 4 or more.
(5) “% Popolani wives” is the percentage of male marriages into female families who
were popolani in social class, during the time period in question.
(6) “% Wealthy wives” is the percentage of male marriages into female families in the
top 25% of average per-household wealth, during the time period in question.
(7) “% Priorate wives” is the percentage of the male family’s wives whose families were
in top ordinal class of Priorate participation that period.
(8) All political faction variables are simple binary (0/1) indicator variables, identifying
whether one or more member of the family was an active member of the faction in
question.

Table 4. Zero-inflated Poisson regressions on Inter-family Marriagesi

Controls:
Expected baselineii
male family seen
female family seen

12821317

13181347

13481377

13781403

14041433

14341463

14641493

6.9468***
.0140
-.0258

3.9616***
.0923
.1117

1.2964***
.3645***
.1688*

3.1385***
.1131
.0184

2.9784***
.1480
.0671

5.5228***
.1773*
.0969

4.6914***
.1703**
.1200(*)

.1205

.2166**

.2318**

.0885

.1493**

.5880***
.1222
-11.080
-.0258
-.1352
-.0235
.0456
.0209
-.2031
-.4190**

.6974***
-.1804
.1047
.0537
.1159
-.0130
-.1459
.3322*
-.7210*
-.3272*

.5978**
-.3143
.3194
.0534
-.1167
-.09049
-.0492
.0102
-.1229
-.2457

.4390*
.0489
.6601
.0868
-.1119
-.0245
-.0028
-.0494
-.2945
-.1114

.4483*
.1730
.5342
.1277
.0193
.0568
.0400
-.0465
-.1883
-.0550

.3556***
.5614***

.1470*
.5580***

.1422*
.4988***

.1563**
.5362***

.0281
.2046*

Large Lineages:iii
households ≥ 5
Social strata:
magnate-magnate
-.0010
magnate-exmagnateiv
exmagnate-exmagnate
magnate-popolani
-.0455
exmagnate-popolani
popolani-popolani
.0027
popolani-new menv -.3662
new men-new men 1.1615
exmagnate-new men
magnate-new men
-.3420
Neighborhood:
same quarter (ngonf)
same gonfalonivi

.4176**
.8896***

.2348
-.1211
.1885
-.0819
.8756*
-.3337
.3716***
.6324***
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Table 4 (cont.) Zero-inflated Poisson regressions on Inter-family Marriages
12821317

13181347

Wealth: tax assessment averagesvii
male & female: top 10% of wealth
male & female: top 10-25% of wealth
male top 25% – female bottom 50%
male bottom 50% – female top 25%
male & female: bottom 50%
Guild: matriculationviii
Calimala (trading)
Cambio (banking)
Lana (wool)ix
Por S. Maria (silk)
Company partnerships:x
Int’l merchant-bank
Domestic banking
-2.5547
Wool manufacturing
Silk manufacturing

.2151
-.1394
-.3674

-.1714

13481377

13781403

14041433

14341463

14641493

.4062**
.2256**
-.1292
-.2079*
.1102

.3625**
.2099*
-.2597**
-.2128*
-.0202

.4707***
.1622(*)
-.3224**
-.2602**
.1919

.2654*
.1570*
-.3330***
-.2593**
.1341

.3995***
.0941
-.1680*
-.1645*
.0378

.2851
.1360
.1179

.0746
.0318
.1254
-3.358

.2014*
.1712*
.16647*
-.1410

.1759(*)
.0315

.1874*
-.0118

.1101

-.2778

1.0382
.0169

-.0787
.5469*
.3880
1.1257**

-.1053
.0881
.1819
.45349

.0257

.0711**
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Table 4 (cont.) Zero-inflated Poisson regressions on Inter-family Marriages
12821317

13181347

13481377

13781403

14041433

14341463

14641493

Political office: Cumulative Prioratexi
male & fem. top 25% -.2517
-.3482

.2525

.1013

.2650*

-.2101

.0059

Political office: Prioratexii
male & female ≥ 3
-.0576
male & female 1-2
.0444

-.1536
-.0437

-.1134
.1792

.0561
-.0676

-.1653
-.1058

.0676
-.1147

.0977
-.1859

Political office: Mercanzia
male & female ≥ 1
.1425

.0489

.1222

.1535

.0953

.0987

.1141(*)

.4802***
.3194
.1843
-.1990
.0258
.48947***

.4577***
.1824
.0963
.2688
.3418***
.0739

.2480*
.2181
.0900
.2957
.5562***
.2534*

.2418*
.2283
.2354(*)
.1544
.0883
.1603

.1780(*)
.1493
.0468
.0942
.1303
.2792**

.0483
.0656
.0604
.2134**
.2278*
-.0650

Political factions:
Black guelfs (1301)
.3995*
White guelfs (1301) -.4561
Albizzi partisans
.0950
Ricci partisans
.5190
anti-ciompi (1378)
-.0454
pro-ciompi (1378)
.3288
xiii
Oligarchs (1433)
Mediceans (1433)
Mediceans (1449)
anti-Mediceansxiv (1466)
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Table 4 (cont.) Zero-inflated Poisson regressions on Inter-family Marriages
12821317

13181347

13481377

13781403

14041433

14341463

14641493

Poisson constant

-3.798***

-3.837***

-3.742***

-4.198***

-4.078***

-3.989***

-3.987***

Inflated zeros:
Expected baseline
zeros constant

-393.52***
4.178***

-377.84***
4.157***

-218.41***
3.830***

-602.34***
3.959***

-443.49***
3.827***

-344.13***
3.679***

-362.62***
3.698***

# dyads
# non-zero dyads

40,000
244

116,964
589

425,104
1,561

416,025
1,262

372,100
1,258

501,264
1,888

497,025
2,183

Log likelihood
LR chi2

-1136.79
101.25

-2836.28
279.53

-8091.84
629.65

-6787.32
543.49

-6622.74
466.47

-9884.76
552.82

-11041.36
675.28

***

= (p < .001); ** = (p < .01); * = (p < .05); (*) = (p < .06)

i

Families were included in these dyad-based Poisson regressions only if at least one marriage (son or

daughter) by them was observed in the period in question.
ii

“Expected baseline” was calculated from marriage marginals (i.e., total numbers of brides and grooms) in

chi-square manner. This calculation controls for the tautological aspect of family size – namely, the fact
that size is statistically important simply because large families produce more sons and daughters to marry.
iii

“Family size” was calculated as the lineage’s average number of households, as measured by tax

censuses at beginning and end of reported periods [i.e., the 1352, 1379, 1403, 1427, 1458, and 1480 tax
censuses]. “Large lineages” is a binary variable defined as 1 if both lineages had greater than or equal to
five households in average family size, and zero otherwise. Because of the inclusion of “expected baseline”
as control, the statistical effect of this variable is above and beyond the tautological aspect of family size.
iv

Klapisch-Zuber (2006) provides valuable information on when some magnate families’ legal status was

repealed. All magnates’ legal status was repealed in 1434, but in the last two regressions I maintain the
1433 status of magnate families, to see if there was a residual effect on marriage even after legal repeal.
v

Because of similar coefficients between new men and new-new men, in this table I aggregated new men

and new-new men into the combined stratum of “new men” – namely, “ancestor admitted to priorate 13431433.”
vi

For this purpose, “modal gonfaloni” was measured in tax census at end of respective period. For the first

1282-1317 period, gonfaloni data from the first available 1352 tax census was projected backward.
vii

Tax assessment “averages” in two senses: (a) tax census at beginning and at end of period, and (b)

household average within each patrilineage. In order to average them, tax censuses first were made
comparable through normalization at mean of respective tax assessments of households in my dataset.
viii

“Families in same guild” defined as both lineages having had at least two members matriculate in the

guild during the period in question.
ix

I have not yet finished coding the matriculation records of Arte della Lana for 1441-1500.

x

“Company partnerships” defined in units of partner-years. That is, the independent variable here is the

total number of times a company partnership is observed between the two patrilineages’ members, over the
years of observation of companies available to me. Because the varying numbers of years available to my
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observation, company-partnership coefficients are not comparable in magnitude across periods, as they are
for all other variables.
xi

“Cumulative Priorate” was measured by total number of priorate offices held by families since 1282.

Dummy-variable measure equaled 1 when both male and female families were in set of top families
collectively having held 25% of seats, and it equaled 0 otherwise.
xii

“Priorate” was measured by number of priorate offices held by families during period in question.

Dummy-variable measure equaled 1 when both male and female families were in set of families with ≥ 3
offices (or as indicated), and it equaled 0 otherwise.
xiii

The coefficient for “oligarchs” was significant for 1404-1433 until the anti-ciompi variable was

included. This indicates that marriage was an important organizational component of that faction, but that
this inherited component was a residue of the Ciompi revolt, as discussed in Padgett and Ansell (1993).
xiv

Families of the top 125 signatories of the anti-Medician petition reported and discussed in Pampaloni

(1964). “Top 125” chosen as cutoff to make comparable with sizes of Kent’s 1433 lists.

